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Comments on OMB’s Interim
Guidance Implementing Section 2
of Executive Order 13,771 “Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs”
By Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
Ed. Note: The following is an abridged version of comments submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in response to its request for
comments on Section 2 of its Interim Guidance on Executive Order 13,771. The comments are largely directed at the guidance, not the E.O. itself.
OMB subsequently published comments that it received on the Interim Guidance. See www.regulations.gov (Docket ID OMB-2017-0002).
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hank you for requesting
comments. My first comment
is that I hope that OMB will
publish all comments received on this
memorandum along with its responses.
The rest of my comments are directed
to the Q & A in the Memorandum:

A. Coverage
1. I support the limitation of application of E.O. 13,771’s requirements
only to significant regulatory
actions and to exclude “transfer
rules.” I also support your approach
of asking independent agencies to
participate voluntarily, but you
should provide a definition of
“independent agencies.”
2. The Executive Order’s coverage of
“guidance/interpretive documents,”
which you say should be handled on
a case-by-case basis, seems problematic. First, I have never understood
how true guidance documents (which
by definition are not supposed to be
binding on regulated parties) can even
have measurable costs.
More importantly, the last thing
that regulated parties would want is
to cut off the f low of guidance documents. If the Executive Order applies
to guidance documents, then an
agency could not issue them without
eliminating two “existing regulatory
actions” of equivalent cost. This
would surely chill the issuance of
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guidance. And even assuming the
agency could measure the cost of a
new guidance document, presumably
they would naturally tend to want to
eliminate other guidance documents
to meet the 2 for 1 test. Would that
mean they no longer believe in the
policies ref lected in the eliminated
guidance documents? Or simply
that they have de-published them?
This seems exceedingly complicated
and subject to subjective scoring.
So I would urge the Director to
categorically eliminate non-binding
guidance documents from this
process. If you are unwilling to do
that, you should at least provide some
helpful examples of how you have
determined the costs of “significant
guidance documents” in your
reviews under E.O. 12,866.
3. As for what constitutes an offsetting “deregulatory action,” you
suggest that agencies can count
“burden reduction through the repeal
or streamlining of mandatory reporting, recordkeeping or disclosure
requirements,” but that “[a]gencies
should also confirm that they will
continue to achieve their regulatory objectives after the deregulatory
action is undertaken.” That makes
sense on a micro-level—reducing
reporting requirements should not be
done if it will undermine the effectiveness of the underlying regulation.
But shouldn’t this be true on a macro
level as well? Should an agency ever
repeal a regulation if doing so will
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prevent the agency from achieving its
statutory objectives?

B. Accounting Questions
1. You say that costs should be
measured as “the opportunity cost to
society” and that OMB Circular A-4
defines this concept. But after looking
at that Circular, it is apparent that the
Circular contains many pages trying
to explain how to assess costs. Your
guidance should provide agencies with
a more simplified way of estimating
costs in a good faith way. You also
later say that, “in general, the start
and end points for the annualization
of costs should be directly comparable
across the new and corresponding
repealed regulatory actions.” This adds
yet another layer of complexity.
2. You also suggest that, “Purely
deregulatory actions that confer only
savings to all affected parties generally will not trigger the requirement
under Section 2(a) for the agency
to identify two existing regulatory
actions to be repealed. However, if
such deregulatory actions impose costs
on individuals or entities, agencies
will need to offset those costs.” This
is confusing. Most actions, whether
regulatory or deregulatory in intent,
will benefit some third parties and
have an adverse effect on others. For
example, an action that eliminates
a requirement that factories install
scrubbers on their smokestacks will
clearly benefit some factories, but it
will adversely affect those factories
that have already installed them, not
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to mention the companies that make
and sell scrubbers. So would those
latter “costs” have to be offset?
3. You say that “future energy cost
savings for rules that require the
adoption of more energy efficient
technologies [cannot] be counted
against the compliance costs of a
regulatory action.” But why not?
If an energy efficient technology produces future cost savings,
why shouldn’t that offset whatever
short-term costs are accrued? This
answer seems to illustrate the overall
main shortcoming of the Executive
Order—namely that it does
not account for the benefits of
regulations at all. Why does the
Executive Order focus so strongly
on “cost savings” yet ignore benefits—which are often the same as
“cost savings”?
4. You say that generally agencies
cannot use previously estimated
costs from an original Regulatory
Impact Analysis in determining the
cost savings generated by an eliminated regulatory action. Instead,
agencies will have to use “the most
current information available on
projected cost savings (e.g., new
information on the cost of operating
compliance technologies)… to the
extent feasible.” Given that this task
will surely require intensive factual
investigation, I recommend that you
clarify that the agency’s resource
limitations have a bearing on the
“extent” to which intensive factual
investigation would be “feasible.”
It will also likely require numerous clearances under the Paperwork
Reduction Act for surveys of
affected regulated entities, so you
perhaps should exempt such surveys
from the Act. Given all these
difficulties, it might be better to
allow agencies to make a good faith
estimate of these estimated cost
savings, using whatever data they
can readily obtain.

Administrative & Regulatory Law News

C. Process and Waiver
Questions
1. In the first Q & A under this
section, you provide some needed
f lexibility by saying: “Emergencies
addressing critical health, safety, or
financial matters, or for some other
compelling reason, may qualify for
a waiver ….” But the way that is
worded, it sounds like there must
be an emergency for a waiver, no
matter what the other compelling
reason might be. I would re-word
it as follows: “Waivers may be
requested for emergencies addressing critical health, safety, or financial
matters, or for some other compelling reason.”

[T]he requirement of
‘two’ seems unnecessary
and nonsensical.
2. You say: “Agencies may proceed
with significant regulatory actions
that need to be finalized in order to
comply with an imminent statutory
or judicial deadline even if they are
not able to identify offsetting regulatory actions by the time of issuance….
In all cases, however, agencies should
identify additional regulatory actions
to be repealed in order to offset the
cost of the new significant regulatory
action, even if such action is required
by law.”
I would interpret the E.O.’s phrase
“unless otherwise required by law”
to allow agencies to issue rules that
are mandated by Congress or a
court without having to follow the
2 for 1 rule. Why should an agency
have to eliminate other regulations
just because they are following the
dictates of Congress or the courts?
In fact, that requirement will probably lead to foot-dragging on the
part of the agency in carrying out
Congress’s will.
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3. You say that “regulatory and
deregulatory actions [can] be
bundled in the same regulatory
action,” but that “the agency must
clearly identify the specific provisions that are counted within the
regulatory and deregulatory portion
of the rules, and the costs and cost
savings associated with each. The net
cost impact (the difference between
costs imposed and cost savings) of
such rules will generally determine
whether they are regulatory actions
that need to be offset.”
It’s unclear from this whether, if
an agency did do this bundling, the
agency would still have to identify
two existing rules to repeal. It would
seem like the answer should be no, if
the bundled rule had no net costs.
4. The previous comment illustrates another confusing aspect of
this Executive Order. Many of the
answers you give in the Q & A indicate that the key thing for the agency
to do is offset the costs of any new
rule by eliminating costs in two
other existing rules. But in the previous answer you seem to indicate that
a bundled rule could achieve that
without designating two existing
rules for repeal. In fact, the number
“two” seems totally artificial. If
the agency needed to identify four
existing rules in order to achieve the
offset, could it do so? What if they
found one existing rule that exactly
offset the new rule, would they still
have to designate another rule for
repeal? Indeed, the requirement
of “two” seems unnecessary and
nonsensical.
5. The next issue is how this is done
within the notice-and-comment
process mandated by the APA. The
Executive Order rightly makes clear
that “[a]ny agency eliminating existing
costs … shall do so in accordance with
the [APA] and other applicable law.”
The guidance tries to address how this
should be done. It says:
For many significant regulatory
actions, the most appropriate place
[to identify the two rules targeted
for repeal] is in the preamble of the
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rule being issued for notice and
comment or promulgated. To the
extent feasible, regulatory actions
should be eliminated before or
on the same schedule as the new
regulatory action they offset.
In cases where finalizing an offsetting regulation is not possible,
agencies should provide a plan for
finalizing the offsetting regulation. The most appropriate place
for such a plan is the preamble of
the rule being issued.
But this will result in a noticeand-comment procedure that is
foreordained. What would the
purpose be for the comment period?
If the public comments show that the
targeted rules’ benefits are greater
than the costs and that there is no
good reason for rescinding them,
then the agency would be bound
(by case law interpreting the APA)
to not rescind those rules. What
then? Would the agency have to try

Update
On April 5, 2017 OMB released updated guidance on E.O. 13,771.
Among other things, the supplemental guidance document (1) outlines
significant details regarding how costs should be calculated; (2) explains
how cost savings should be measured for purposes of complying with the
two-for-one requirement; and (3) provides additional guidance on which
regulatory actions might be exempted from the requirement.

rescinding two other existing rules?
And so on? Moreover, there is a
significant risk that, if the agency
did rescind these rules, the rescission
would be challenged and the agency
would not be able to defend the
rescission or to say with any credibility that it considered the comments
with an open mind. Would this lead
to agencies proposing to eliminate,
say, ten rules in the hopes that they
might end up with two rescissions
that could be defended?

6. You say that savings can be transferred within an agency. I assume this
also means within a Department. If
so, you should make that clear.
7. What about joint regulations—
those that are issued by more than
one agency? How would that work?
In the issuance phase, would both
agencies have to identify two regulations to repeal, or could they both
identify one?

The REINS Act:
Constitutional, But a Bad Idea
By Jonathan R. Siegel*

C

ongress is considering a revolutionary change to the federal
rulemaking process. The
Regulations from the Executive in
Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act,
which passed the House of Representatives in January, would provide that
when any federal agency promulgates a “major rule” (as statutorily
defined), the rule would be ineffective unless Congress passes a joint
resolution approving the rule. The
REINS Act would reverse the procedure of the current Congressional
Review Act (CRA). Currently, the
CRA provides that when a federal
agency promulgates a major rule,
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Congress may pass a “ joint resolution
of disapproval” blocking the rule,
but if Congress fails to do so, the rule
takes effect.
Although it’s getting a lot of play
right now, the CRA rarely has any
impact. It allows Congress to block
a rule only by passing a disapproval
statute, and the President can veto
the statute. Moreover, the President
usually would veto such a statute,
because the President would usually
support a major rule coming from an
executive agency. The CRA has so
far had an impact only in the unusual
periods (such as right now) when a
new administration takes over and
Congress uses the CRA to block rules
from the previous administration.
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The REINS Act, by contrast,
would give Congress enormously
increased power over rulemaking,
because it would require every major
rule to win affirmative approval
from Congress. In times of divided
government, when at least one
house of Congress is controlled by a
political party different from that of
the President, no major rule could
become effective without support
from at least some members of both
parties. Given the strong divisions
between the parties, the REINS
Act could powerfully impact federal
rulemaking, perhaps even grinding it
to a halt.
With such a monumental change
on the table, it is only natural to ask
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